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The intellectual history of the American Law Institute’s (ALI)
restatement of torts project tells a tale of great ambition,
imagination, success, and failure. Unlike in other areas of the law,
where parallel work by the Uniform Law Commission has led to the
widespread adoption of uniform statutes across American states, in
the law of tort, American courts generally continue to develop the
1
law according to common law traditions on a case-by-case basis.
The tort restatements have played a critical role in shaping the
2
debate on common law principles by American lawyers and jurists.
3
The latest iteration of the restatement, released in part in 2010,
†
Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law; J.D., Yale Law
School (2001); A.B., Harvard College (1998).
1. See Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort
Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 927 (1996).
2. See Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 436–37 (2004); see also Charles W. Wolfram,
Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 820 (1998)
(describing the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) as having essentially
“launch[ed] . . . the products liability field of litigation.”).
3. The first portion of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm was released in 2010 (covering basic topics in the
law of torts), while a follow-on portion, covering landowner liability, affirmative
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will no doubt have a similar influence.
The ambitions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)
4
(Second Restatement) were far more sweeping than those of the
5
Restatement (First) of Torts (1934) (First Restatement). The First
Restatement seems almost quaint and unimaginative compared to
6
the Second Restatement. This is perhaps not surprising, given that
7
it was the ALI’s first attempt to “restate” the law —perhaps scholars,
commentators, and readers should praise the imaginative nature of
the project itself, without nitpicking the authors’ substantive
formulations of the law. The First Restatement’s goals, however,
8
were largely functional and positivist; it sought to provide certainty
at the end of an era of perceived legal change by providing a
“prima facie . . . correct statement of the general law of the United
9
States.”
10
The First Restatement, prepared between 1923 and 1934,
preceded sweeping technological change that drastically altered
the nature and economic impact of accidents—most notably the
widespread adoption of that unparalleled instrument of death,
11
destruction, and mayhem—the motorized carriage. The authors
duties, and other topics, will be released in 2011. See Current Projects, AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=16
(last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
5. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement
(Fourth) of Torts, 50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 586–87 (2002) (describing the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as a “monumental undertaking[]” that took more than two
decades to complete). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introduction, at
ix (1965) (explaining that the Institute will articulate more comprehensively “the
reasons for positions, taken,” as well as reporter’s notes and references to court
opinions), with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, Introduction, at ix (1934) (noting
that the Institute aims to have “the legal profession accept[] the Restatement as . .
. a correct statement.”).
6. Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—The
American Law Institute’s Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 743,
744 (1998) (“The diverse views of different state courts were slowly and carefully
evaluated. In general, when the Restatement (First) of Torts derived a rule, the
majority rule was chosen.”).
7. Id. at 743.
8. Jordan K. Kolar, Note, Is This Really the End of Duty?: The Evolution of the
Third Restatement of Torts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 233, 242 (2002).
9. Id. (quoting WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS,
Introduction, at ix (1939)).
10. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 744.
11. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 519–20 (3d ed.
2005) (“By the 1920s . . . this was fast on the way to becoming a society of people
with cars. . . . [T]he automobile accident replaced the train accident as the staple
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of the Second Restatement had the opportunity to reflect both on
12
the nature of technological change and a window into emerging
developments in insurance law and coverage that would come to
13
change the on-the-ground realities of accident liability.
The authors of the Second Restatement had grand
ambitions—hoping to move American tort law into a new age, and
to leave behind many of the seemingly anachronistic limitations
14
inherited from English tort jurisprudence. In areas from the law
of causation in negligence, to the availability of damages in cases of
mental distress, to the liability of the manufacturers of products,
the authors of the Second Restatement’s various components
proposed radical change in a document that, in many respects,
15
reads like an academic’s polemic.
In some areas, the Second
16
Restatement succeeded wildly; in others, it was a failure of
17
singular magnitude in the history of American law reform.
As the Restatement (Third) of Torts (Third Restatement)
project nears completion, signs of its authors’ guiding principles
emerge, both from their comments and writings, and from the
nature of the document they have produced. Unlike with the
Second Restatement, the ALI structured work on the Third
18
Restatement into a series of discrete projects.
The Products
19
Liability portions were published in 1998, the Apportionment of
20
Liability provisions two years later, and the third piece, Liability
of personal injury law . . . .”).
12. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745.
13. Friedman, supra note 11, at 520 (suggesting insurance companies,
reacting to widespread use of the automobile, became “[t]he real parties in
interest” throughout the expansion of tort law).
14. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745 (“Most importantly, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts differed from the Restatement (First) of Torts in that its content
was shaped more by the Reporters’ and advisory committee’s evaluation of the
wisdom of competing case law than a presumption to follow ‘clear majority’
rules.”).
15. In the Second Restatement, for the first time the ALI seems to have
turned its attention to academic criticism of tort rules, and this may explain its
new purpose: “normative prescription.” Kolar, supra note 8, at 243.
16. For instance, the Second Restatement’s embrace of strict liability for
defective product cases became widely adopted.
17. For instance, to the extent that its authors intended the “substantial
factor” test to replace the traditional legal tests for cause-in-fact and proximate
cause, the Second Restatement failed.
18. Michael D. Green & Larry S. Stewart, The New Restatement’s Top 10 Tort
Tools, 46 TRIAL 44 (Apr. 2010).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000).
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21

for Physical and Emotional Harm, entered its final stages in the
22
last few years.
The story of the Third Restatement and its progenitors bears a
remarkable resemblance to the great technological revolution of
23
the century’s end: the World Wide Web. Observers of the internet
have recently coined the phrase “Web 2.0” to describe the
24
emergence of a second generation of internet offerings.
Under this formulation, the first generation of internet
activity, “Web 1.0,” is recognized for its broad, sweeping ambitions,
25
and for both spectacular successes and failures. First-generation
web activity treated users as passive—presenting them with
information or choices, but involving them in web content on only
26
a limited basis. Many Web 1.0 sites, such as the online grocer
27
Spending on such sites
Webvan, were spectacular failures.
matched their ambitions—Webvan, for instance, committed one
billion dollars to build new warehouses soon before collapsing in
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
22. Green & Stewart, supra note 18, at 44.
23. Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 261 (2003) (explaining that the invention
and development of the World Wide Web in the early 1990s allowed for the
beginnings of widespread use of the internet by the general public).
24. Dale Dougherty reportedly coined the term to “describe technologies that
turn the Internet into an active blend of mashed-together information.” Elizabeth
Corcoran, Hacking a Trend, FORBES MAG., Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.forbes.com
/forbes/2008/0901/080.html. Others cite O’Reilly Media, Dougherty’s employer,
as the origin of the term. Brian Deagon, However It’s Defined, Web 2.0 Means Money;
Tech Firms Scrambling to Cash in on New Wave of Internet Innovation, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY, Dec. 4, 2006, at A08; Dan Fost, What Exactly Does Web 2.0 Mean? Well…, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Nov. 5, 2006, at F5, available at http://articles.sfgate.com
/2006-11-05/business/17320641_1_world-wide-web-windows-platform-live-web/2; Web
2.0 Defines Next Generation, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 30, 2007, at C2. Perhaps fittingly,
the term “Web 2.0” was selected to be the one millionth word in the English
language. Newest Word: Web 2.0, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 11, 2009, at A2.
25. See Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part
One—Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 880–81 (2008)
(discussing the opportunities and shortfalls associated with Web 1.0).
26. See generally Mary Madden & Susannah Fox, Riding the Waves of “Web 2.0”:
More Than a Buzzword, But Still Not Easily Defined, PEW INTERNET PROJECT (Oct. 5,
2006), http://www.culturadigitale.it/Schede/PIP_Web_2.0.pdf (discussing the
differences between user activity on Web 1.0 and Web 2.0).
27. Christopher Steiner, Bot-in-Time Delivery, FORBES MAG., Mar. 16, 2009, at
40, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0316/040_bot_time_saves
_nine.html.
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28

2001 in a “spectacular disaster.”
The great revolution of Web 1.0 was the democratization of
access to information. So long as a person had access to the
internet, she “had access to the same information as everyone else,”
whether sitting in a “Harvard law library or a row house in Dublin
29
or a grass hut in Africa.” “Web 1.0 users’ characteristic activity was
30
surfing static Internet pages.”
Web 2.0, by contrast, is based upon the “architecture of
31
participation.” Content in Web 2.0 is not locked onto pages, but
broken up into “nuggets” that can be deployed wherever users
32
want. Web 2.0 offerings are organic, rather than pre-planned,
developing according to the preferences and drives of users rather
33
than the visions of site planners and developers.
The signal
34
achievement of Web 2.0 is the internet encyclopedia “Wikipedia,”
in which users freely update encyclopedia entries. The theory
behind the site is that “if millions of eyes monitor encyclopedia
entries that anyone can write and rewrite . . . the result will take on
35
Britannica.”

28. Id.
29. Justin Ewers, On the Record: Dan Nova, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 28, 2006,
available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060820/28record.htm.
30. Peter Lunenfeld, Welcome to Web 2.0, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 11.
31. Steven Levy, Farewell, Web 1.0! We Hardly Knew Ye., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18,
2004, at 20, available at http://www.newsweek.com/2004/10/17/farewell-web1-0-we-hardly-knew-ye.html.
32. Id.
33. According to advocates of the Web 2.0 concept, examples of the
distinction include:
Netscape the browser was the “standard bearer” for “Web 1.0”; Google
the search engine is the new standard bearer. In Web 1.0, Britannica
Online became a popular reference; in Web 2.0, we have Wikipedia,
which allows user input. Rather than “publishing” content as we did in
Web 1.0, we’re now “participating” in the dissemination of information.
Daniel E. Harmon, The “New” Web: Getting a Grip on the Slippery Concept of Web 1.0,
LAW. PC (West, Eagan, Minn.), Jan. 1, 2006, at 1.
34. David Wallace-Wells, Rage Against the Machine, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2010, at 63,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/06/rage-against-the-machine.html.
35. Steven Levy, The New Wisdom of the Web: Why Is Everyone so Happy in Silicon
Valley Again? A New Wave of Start-ups Are Cashing in on the Next Stage of the Internet.
And This time, It’s All About . . . You, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 3, 2006, at 47, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2006/04/02/the-new-wisdom-of-the-web.html.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3

2011]

TORTS 2.0

1587

Under Web 2.0, the view of content-creators as “authoritarian
36
figure[s] gives way to a . . . wisdom-of-the-crowds process.” The
“great lesson of the Web 2.0 era is that to control quality, you don’t
37
lock things down; you open them up.” Under Web 2.0, “everyone
38
has a voice.” Web 2.0 moves from the notion, “if you build it, they
39
will come,” to the notion, “if they build it, they will come.” Web 2.0
40
transforms the internet experience from a lecture to a discussion.
User interface in Web 2.0 “yields a result that no amount of hands41
on filtering could have managed.” The key components of Web
2.0 include “using the Web as a platform,” “harnessing collective
intelligence,” and “enriching data for a deeper online
42
experience.”
In spite of its apparent commercial power, Web 2.0 is not
without its critics. Michael Gorman foresees “a world in which
43
everyone is an expert in a world devoid of expertise.” Still, the
success of early Web 2.0 offerings provides strong support for the
notion that internet users have long craved a more participatory
role and that the days of “top down” internet development may
have drawn to an end.
Read by comparison to the Second Restatement, the new
Third Restatement shares many of Web 2.0’s characteristics.
Unlike the top-down approach chosen by the authors of the
Second Restatement, in which sweeping reforms were “stated” to
American courts, the authors of the Third Restatement have
developed a more general, organic approach to the law of torts.
This approach is participatory in the sense that it leaves state
common-law courts the task of wrestling with the nuance of tort
doctrine and filling the gaps in stated rules according to their own

36. Steven Levy, The Future of Reading: Amazon’s Jeff Bezos Already Built a Better
Bookstore. Now He Believes He Can Improve Upon One of Humankind’s Most Divine
Creations: The Book Itself, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2007, at 54, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2007/11/17/the-future-of-reading.html.
37. Jimmy Wales, Open-Door Policy, FORBES MAG., May 7, 2007, at 190, available
at http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0507/190.html.
38. Ewers, supra note 29.
39. Id. (second emphasis added).
40. Colin Stewart, Whither Web 2.0?, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 24, 2006,
available at http://www.ocregister.com/articles/web-41589-company-venture.html.
41. Levy, supra note 35, at 47.
42. Fost, supra note 24, at F5.
43. Michael Gorman, Web 2.0: The Sleep of Reason, Part II, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA BLOG (June 12, 2007), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2007/06
/web-20-the-sleep-of-reason-part-ii/.
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wisdom and experience.
I.

THE SECOND RESTATEMENT AS WEB 1.0

A. Ambitions
The Second Restatement was remarkable as a law reform
document, if not quite the “statement” of the common law it was
44
supposed to be. Its authors seemed to focus on the “re” rather
than the “statement,” suggesting sweeping “re”-forms in a variety of
45
areas of tort law. In that sense, for better at times and worse at
others, the Second Restatement was inconsistent with the organic
46
and evolutionary traditions of the Anglo-American common law.
Rather than wait for rules to crystallize across courts and across
time, the authors of the Second Restatement sought to impose
certain reforms on American tort law, in some cases, before the
47
time for such reforms seemed to have come. As Victor Schwartz
observed, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts Differed from the
Restatement (First) of Torts in that its content was shaped
more by the Reporters’ and advisory committee’s
evaluation of the wisdom of competing case law than a
presumption to follow “clear majority” rules. The so-called
“minority rule” frequently made its way into the “black
48
letter.”

44. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745.
45. See id. (stating that many minority rules made their way into the “black
letter” rules contemplated throughout the entire restatement).
46. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 2, at 817–19.
47. The appropriate role for the authors of a restatement is a subject of some
contention. David Robertson argues that “a ‘restatement’ of a body of court
decisions should capture, explain, and enhance the best available judicial views,
but . . . should not offer up as something visible or immanent in existing law any
proposition or approach that is in realty brand-new, wholly lacking any trace of
judicial acceptance.” David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2009). On the
other hand, Ellen Bublick suggests that “when designing a system of liability, a
Restatement need not be sanguine about adopting a patchwork of liability rules
that cannot be reconciled on any principled basis.” Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons—Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1335, 1336 (2009).
48. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 745.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3

2011]

TORTS 2.0

1589

Indeed, the Second Restatement likely represents the
beginning of the ALI’s shift from simply stating the law to
49
prescribing what the law should be.
The Second Restatement was a “compendious depiction of tort
doctrines” that “functioned to provide courts and litigants with
50
definitive fixed answers to tort questions.”
It “emphasize[d]
detailed treatment at the occasional expense of a general
articulation of principles,” at times sacrificing “the opportunity that
generalization presents to explore underlying rationales more
51
fully.”
One of the great ambitions of the Second Restatement
concerned liability for injuries caused by products. Section 402A,
promulgated in 1964, imposed liability for the sellers of products
52
regardless of whether a seller “exercised all possible care.” This
sweeping reform was embraced by courts “[w]ith a gusto
53
unmatched in the annals of the Restatements of the Law.” David
Owen observes,
Tort law has probably never witnessed such a rapid,
widespread, and altogether explosive change in the rules
and theory of legal responsibility. If ever a Restatement
reformulation of the law were accepted uncritically as
divine, surely it was section 402A of the Restatement
54
(Second) of Torts.
To those who view the purpose of a restatement project as
“restat[ing] the current law, not creat[ing] new law,” Section 402A
55
represents “an anomaly.” The section “did not restate the law,”
instead, it “created or molded products liability law for decades and
has been referred to as the ‘bible’ or ‘holy grail’ of products
56
liability law.”
49. John H. Marks, The Limit to Premises Liability for Harms Caused by “Known of
Obvious” Dangers: Will It Trip and Fall Over the Duty-Breach Framework Emerging in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts?, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2005).
50. Bublick, supra note 47, at 1340.
51. Deborah A. DeMott, A Revised Prospectus for a Third Restatement of Agency, 31
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1998).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
53. David G. Owen, Design Defect Ghosts, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 927, 935 (2009).
54. Id.
55. Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, The Impact of the Restatement (Third), Torts:
Products Liability (1998) on Product Liability Law, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 105,
105 (2008).
56. Id. But see George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability? 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 (2000) (“Section 402A ratified a
body of product-defect case law emerging from the state courts in the 1960s.”).
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B. Spectacular Failures
Like many websites and businesses launched in the era of Web
1.0, some of the Second Restatement’s reform efforts were
spectacular failures. Some of these failures became clear within the
first years if not months of the promulgation of relevant
restatement provisions, while others became cumbersome and
57
unworkable over a longer period of time.
Perhaps the most ambitious doctrinal change in the Second
Restatement concerned its treatment of causation in the law of
negligence. Traditional causation analysis required two steps.
First, defendant’s conduct must have been a “cause-in-fact” of
plaintiff’s injury, most commonly demonstrated by showing that,
“but for” the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would have been
58
free of the injury.
Second, the defendant’s breach must have
been a “proximate cause” of plaintiff’s harm—specifically, a cause
near enough to the harm that it is appropriate to assign liability to
59
the defendant.
Both traditional tests for the common law doctrine of
causation are linguistically complex and difficult for both students
of the law and courts to understand and apply. The formulation of
60
“but-for-cause” requires an awkward double-negative in that one
asks whether, without the breach, the plaintiff would be without
61
damages, and challenges courts and juries to engage in counter57. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 747–48 (noting that thirty years of
litigation resulted when the restatement’s black letter formula substituted words
from its authors in place of the exact language used in a pivotal case).
58. See John D. Rue, Returning to the Roots of the Bramble Bush: The “But For” Test
Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Institute’s Proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2681 (2003).
59. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41,
at 263 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that “proximate cause” is also frequently termed the
“legal cause”).
60. In explaining how to formulate “but for” cause statements for analytical
purposes, the author suggests students envision the test as their friend—indeed,
their best friend—in most negligence problems. So close a friend that it could be
called a best friend forever, or a “BFF” in the common vernacular. The mnemonic
device “BFF” helps frame the but-for-cause inquiry as “But-For . . . Free”: but for the
breach, would the plaintiff have been free of injury? If this “BFF” question is
answered in the affirmative, the breach IS a but-for-cause of plaintiff’s damages,
and thus a cause-in-fact. If answered in the negative, the breach is NOT a but-forcause of plaintiff’s damages, and thus not a cause-in-fact unless one of the special
solutions available in cases such as concert-of-action, multiple sufficient causes, or
alternative liability applies.
61. The “but-for” inquiry “is a significantly complex mental operation.” David
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factual reasoning (what would have happened had X not
62
occurred?) that arguably boils down to simple speculation. And
63
the terms “proximate cause” are “weasel words,” which justify
particular policy conclusions, but in and of themselves, appear to
provide little analytical value.
With that in mind, the authors of the Second Restatement,
64
following the path of the First Restatement, jettisoned the
traditional bipartite approach to causation in favor a single “legal
65
cause” concept.
In order to be liable in negligence, the
defendant’s breach needed to be the “legal cause” of the plaintiff’s
66
damages. “Legal cause” would be established only by a showing
67
that the breach was a “substantial factor” in producing the harm.
In proposing this alternative formulation, the authors of the
68
Second Restatement “walked off a cliff.” The test, according to
the authors of the Third Restatement, has been a “major source of
69
confusion and misunderstanding” and has not “withstood the test
70
of time.” Notably, it has since been withdrawn from the torts
71
treatise of Dean Prosser, its early champion. The failure of the
W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1770 (1997).
62. Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 601,
605 (1929); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L.
REV. 543, 556 (1962); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation
Between Counterfactual “But For” and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and
Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 250 (2001); E.
Wayne Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause In Fact,
46 TEX. L. REV. 423, 431–33 (1968).
63. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 6 n.8 (1970) (“I do not propose
to consider the question of what, if anything, we mean when we say that specific
activities ‘cause,’ in some metaphysical sense, a given accident; in fact, when we
identify an act or activity as a ‘cause,’ we may be expressing any of a number of
ideas.”).
64. See Rue, supra note 58, at 2681.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430 (2010).
66. Id.
67. Id. §431 (“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to
another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”).
68. Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster,
Prosser’s Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L.
REV. 1, 37 (2008).
69. Id.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26 cmt. j (2010).
71. Lavitt, supra note 68, at 37 n.161 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, 43–45 (5th ed. Supp. 1988) (“Even if ‘substantial
factor’ seemed sufficiently intelligible as a guide in time past . . . the development
of several quite distinct and conflicting meanings for the term . . . has created a
risk of confusion and misunderstanding, especially when a court . . . uses the
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Second Restatement’s causation provisions was quickly apparent.
Barely a decade after the provisions were published, the ALI issued
a new version under a new reporter, which attempted to
characterize the earlier efforts as simply being statements about
cause-in-fact—an effort which led to “further anomalies within the
72
Restatement (Second) when read as a whole.”
In sum,
73
“substantial factor” was “mistakenly adopted.”
Certain aspects of the Second Restatement’s work on products
liability can also be described as abject failures. Even though the
Second Restatement’s core notion that products liability claims
should sound in strict liability—as well as via traditional negligence,
74
warranty, and other actions—was widely followed, the actual
doctrines released by the ALI for defining the scope of the
products liability claim were difficult for courts to apply.
In large part, this may be because the drafters of the Second
Restatement presented a sweeping rule of strict liability for product
injury claims based on a thorough understanding of only one type
75
of product defect: mismanufacture. The second form of product
defect, defective design, as it turned out, came to dominate the
products liability caseload of courts in the latter part of the
76
twentieth century.
The rules articulated in the Second
77
Restatement were so broad that they applied to all kinds of claims,
even though they turned out to be a poor fit in the design defect
78
context. Courts have “struggled” since the Second Restatement’s
phrase without indication of which of its conflicting meanings is intended.”).
72. Jane Stapelton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 971 (2001).
73. Lavitt, supra note 68, at 39.
74. Some have called Section 402A the “most successful section of the
Restatement.” Frank J. Vandall & Joshua F. Vandall, A Call for an Accurate
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Design Defect, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 909, 918 (2003) (noting
3,000 citations of the section).
75. See Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement, Third, Torts: Products Liability: A
Model of Fairness and Balance, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 42 (2000) (stating that
the Second Restatement “shed no light on what should be the legal standard for
defect of design”).
76. James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV.
377, 384 (2002) (stating that development of products liability has been and
continues to be in the area of product design and marketing).
77. Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective Product Design: The Quest for WellOrdered Regime, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2009) (“Under 402A there was no
distinction between manufacturing and design defect . . . .”).
78. Id. at 1043 (“Much confusion resulted in the ensuing arguments over the
proper rule for design defect claims. . . . Resulting decisions were a hodge-podge
of rule . . . .”).
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products liability provisions were released regarding how to apply
strict liability “beyond manufacturing defects . . . to the thenemerging context of design safety, where section 402A’s consumer
79
expectations test proved increasingly inadequate.” In time, courts
began to understand that “principles of reasonableness were
necessary to resolve the difficult issues of balance between product
usefulness, safety, cost, practicality, and information dissemination
80
The difficulties in the standards
inherent in such cases.”
81
established by Section 402A are well-documented.
They arose
because courts looked to the language of a broad rule for guidance
in a new category of cases but “were searching for an answer that
82
was not there.”
C. Content Control and “Over-Doctrinalization”
The Second Restatement resembled Web 1.0 in that both
represented top-down efforts to control content. The products
liability provisions of Section 402A of the Second Restatement, for
instance, were “top down law reform[s] motivated . . . by the
enthusiasm of a small group of Legal Realists that saw the
opportunity to make what they saw as a small win-win change to
83
legal entitlements.”
Although laid out in what appeared to be a “neat” fashion,
many of the Second Restatement’s rules left important
84
considerations unclear.
Moreover, many of the Second
Restatement’s rules proved cumbersome when actually taken up by
85
common-law courts. Drafters of restatement language must strive
to render statements of the common law that are correct in all
cases. Two approaches are available. One, selected by the authors
of the Third Restatement, is to describe rules in highly general

79. Owen, supra note 53, at 927.
80. Id. at 935.
81. Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts
Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 832 (2009).
82. Schwartz, supra note 75, at 42.
83. Jane Stapelton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV.
1225, 1229 (2002).
84. Id. (“The apparent neatness, low impact, and intellectual glamour of this
move led its promoters to overlook major gaps in the theoretical foundations of
the rule in the new § 402A.”).
85. For instance, the doctrinal formulation of recklessness is virtually
incomprehensible. See infra nn.89–99 and accompanying text.
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86

terms. The other, at times selected by the authors of the Second
Restatement, is to describe rules with painstaking clarity, including
caveats, exceptions and the like in the formal statement of the
87
rules.
Unfortunately, the latter approach often produces
language that says too much—that “overdoctrinalizes” the rules in
question.
Consider, for instance, the Second Restatement’s articulation
of the important concept of reckless misconduct in tort law,
88
described in section 500. Recklessness is an important concept in
tort law because it provides an escape valve for traditional
limitations on liability arising from a plaintiff’s contributory
89
negligence or primary assumption of risk. In a range of contexts,
plaintiffs must demonstrate recklessness on the part of a defendant
responsible for an injury in order to meet the threshold for
90
recovery.
Moreover, recklessness has been established as a
91
necessary threshold for the imposition of punitive damages.
The authors of the Second Restatement defined this concept
in one of the longest, most awkward compound sentences in the
history of American tort law:
§500. Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined
The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act
which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having
reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable
man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also
that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
92
necessary to make his conduct negligent.

86. See Sugarman, supra note 5, at 587, 590.
87. See id. (referring to Professor Schwartz’s project in coming up with “fewer
and better-presented basic principles that could come to replace a great number
of the sections scattered throughout the four volumes of the Restatement
(Second)”).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
89. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 111, 134 (2008).
90. Id. at 115–16.
91. Id.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
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The comments that followed this section only amplified the
93
confusion this language caused in the courts, as they made “little
94
or no sense.” The rule itself was over-doctrinalized, establishing a
test involving so many elements that the possibility of consistent
95
jurisprudence was eliminated from the outset.
By contrast, the authors of the Third Restatement have
defined the concept in a more organic fashion:
§2. Recklessness
A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if:
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the
conduct or knows facts that make the risk obvious to
another in the person’s situation, and
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk
involves burdens that are so slight relative to the
magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s failure to
adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s
96
indifference to risk.
Notably, this section has moved to the beginning of the new
Third Restatement, a recognition of its importance to courts
97
It also compacts the concept of
developing tort doctrine.
recklessness into two central inquiries: (1) what was the defendant’s
knowledge of the risk or facts suggesting risk?; and (2) does the
defendant’s conduct constitute “aggravated negligence” under the
98
traditional “Hand Formula” so as to demonstrate indifference?
Gone is the confusing language regarding intent. Also gone is the
implicit requirement that the risk-taker know that his conduct
exceeds the legal threshold for negligence. Section two of the new
Third Restatement shows more faith in common law courts to
develop, from the bottom-up, a set of rules to guide determinations
of when wrongful conduct rises to the level of recklessness.

93. Rapp, supra note 89, at 133–52.
94. Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement
(Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1186 n.29 (2001).
95. Rapp, supra note 89, at 135 (“With the doctrine itself hopelessly illdefined, courts have not produced systematically coherent jurisprudence in the
area.”).
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
2 (2010).
97. Authors moved the definition of “recklessness” to Chapter 1, Section 2 in
the Third Restatement.
98. James A. Henderson, Jr., et al., Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical
Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1155–56 (2001).
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II. THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AS WEB 2.0
A. Organic
Unlike earlier versions of the torts restatement, the Third
Restatement is decidedly organic. The bright-line rules and
sweeping reforms of the Second Restatement have given way to law
99
formulations structured in more flexible, open-ended terms. The
Third Restatement is “conceptual” in nature—“focused on
exposing principles and creating processes to guide the
100
development of judicial responses to policy-oriented questions.”
Perhaps the best example of this concerns the Third
Restatement’s treatment of toxic exposure, an issue that courts
101
have struggled with since the 1980s. The ALI addresses this issue
in section twenty-eight. The section and its comments eschewed
“bright-line rules,” instead recognizing that “whether an inference
of causation is appropriate is a matter of informed
102
judgment . . . .”
B. The Architecture of Participation
The Third Restatement, from its early days, embraced the kind
of bottom-up participation that is the cornerstone of Web 2.0. For
instance, the authors of the products liability sections of the Third
Restatement were “centrally concerned with perceived bottom-up
103
pressure on the U.S. products regime from ‘classic design cases.’”
In its “functional, negligence-based definition of design defect,” the
Third Restatement “reflected how courts and lawyers around the
nation increasingly were framing and litigating this central issue of
104
products liability law.”

99. Bublick, supra note 47, at 1340.
100. Id.
101. Green & Stewart, supra note 18, at 46.
102. Id.
103. Stapelton, supra note 83, at 1229.
104. Owen, supra note 53, at 927. But see Vandall & Vandall, supra note 74, at
922 (“[T]he Restatement (Third) . . . delivers a radical concept of negligence and
therefore misrepresents the law.”); Robert L. Habush, 10-Fall KAN. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 49, 53 (2000) (“[T]he Reporters . . . miscounted the judicial support for the
reasonable alternative device requirement . . . .”).
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105

In “deposing”
the Second Restatement’s ambitious
“substantial factor” and “legal cause” approach to causation in favor
of linguistically simplified versions of the traditional “but-for” and
“proximate cause” notions, the authors of the Third Restatement
also embraced a participatory role, in this case for juries. The “butfor” causation inquiry chosen by the Third Restatement “is . . .
more finely adjusted to reliably strengthen the core fact-finding of
106
juries, and less likely to produce peculiar results.”
Moreover, the manner in which the test is framed suggests it
represents an invitation for participation on the causation inquiry
by courts and juries. The Third Restatement is “articulate in
silence as in enunciation,” allowing the “‘but for’ test to stand on its
107
own for the first time . . . .”
C. Caveats
Of course, there are exceptions. With respect to owners and
occupiers of land, the Third Restatement has embraced the
controversial modern trend of a universal reasonable care
standard, even though half of American jurisdictions continue to
108
adhere to the traditional approach that imposes only limited
duties on owners and occupiers of land, based on the category of
109
injured entrant and the nature of the condition causing harm.
While there may be strong academic support for the universal
reasonableness approach, even its supporters have criticized the
manner in which the Third Restatement’s authors are attempting
110
to promulgate the change.
The Third Restatement aims to

105. Lavitt, supra note 68, at 39.
106. Id.
107. Rue, supra note 58, at 2716.
108. See Ann Fievet, Breaking the Law and Getting Paid for It: How the Third
Restatement of Torts Synthesizes Two Distinct Standards of Care Owed to Trespassers, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 246 (2009) (stating that “twenty-six states have chosen to
retain the traditional categories”).
109. See Green & Stewart, supra note 18, at 47.
110. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Land-Possessor Liability in Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Too Much and Too Little, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1079, 1079
(2009) (“I think that it is a mistake to have a separate chapter on land possessors. .
. . [I]ntegrating the topic of land possessors into earlier sections would help us to
make progress on two important substantive themes that, I believe, are not very
helpfully addressed by the Reporters: (1) What are the reasons that justify any noduty rule in tort? (2) In deciding what due care requires, when is a fair warning
sufficient and when must the defendant eliminate . . . the danger by taking
additional precautions?”).
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“purg[e] . . . a tradition of no-duty rulings based on case-specific
111
unforeseeability . . . .”
III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the success of the Third Restatement will only
112
Similarly, the
become clear as courts wrestle with its provisions.
success of Web 2.0 ventures will be decided over time by the
preferences of users and the commercial applications of such sites.
However, both the Third Restatement and Web 2.0 seem
positioned to succeed in a broader fashion than their predecessors,
thanks to their organic, participatory, and bottom-up approaches.

111. Marks, supra note 49, at 4.
112. See MacDougall, supra note 55, at 116 (discussing the effect the Third
Restatement may have on courts).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

17

